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The Impact of Environmental
Liability on Land Use Planning
John Buckley
The threat ofenvironmental liability discourages the resale and reuse of industrial and commercialproperty.
This article discusses the source ofenvironmental liability and reviews its effects on purchasers, lenders, and
insurers. Planners must understandthepervasive andpotentially devastatingimpacts ofenvironmental liability
on developed and virgin land.
Free alienation of real property has always been a rea-
sonably well achieved goal. With the passage of various
environmental statutes by Congress, however, a new bar-
rier has sprung up to slow the purchase and sale of real
estate. This barrier is environmental liability, and it has its
largest impact on existing industrial and commercial prop-
erty.
Historical Perspective on Real Property Law
In recent years, the laws affectingownership ofland in the
United States have fundamentally changed. Under the
common law generally adopted by the individual states
from the old English system of law, property consisted of a
bundle of rights. The owner of property was an owner of
rights,whether theywere mineral rights, water rights, or the
right to exclusive possession of the land. Property entailed
rights.
Early in the twentieth century the law recognized the
ability of the government to regulate the use of these rights
without compensating the owner. This regulation, largely
expressed through zoning, permitted restrictions on the
use of land so long as the restriction did not consume the
entire bundle ofrights. Ifthe regulation did in fact consume
the bundle, then the regulation constituted a "taking" and
had to be compensated for by the government.
In 1980, Congress established a new bundle of property
rightswhich entailed responsibilities. This new bundle had
been developing for some time, because of dissatisfaction
with the remedies available under the common law and
zoning. While the common law had recognized responsi-
bilities attached to the use of land, there had never been an
omnipresent bundle of responsibilities associated with its
ownership (except possibly the responsibility to pay taxes).
The market's perception of land ownership is changing,
which affects the potential for reuse ofmany forms of real
estate. The land use planner must factor this changing
perception into proposals.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)
In 1980, during a lame-duck session, Congress hastily
enacted an environmental statute known as the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA or "Superfund"). At the time it
was heralded as one of the most frightening and promis-
ing ofenvironmental statutes. Both of these descriptions
have proven true. In part, the strength of CERCLA
resides in its initially vague drafting, since clarified by the
1986 amendments.
The statute earned a well-deserved "quirky notoriety"
with judges who attempted to interpret its extensive lia-
bility scheme. The legislative history of the statute is one
of almost comical contradiction, making interpretation
difficult at best. Still, this vagueness and contradiction are
the elements that have made the statute so strong. Courts
have been given wide latitude in fashioning liability for
environmental harm. And they have been liberal in
finding liability.
How CERCLA Works
CERCLA established a Hazard Response Trust Fund,
the so-called "Superfund." The government uses this
fund to clean-up hazardous waste sites known as "Super-
fund sites." The Superfund was initially funded by oil
taxes, although it is intended to be refunded by individu-
als or corporations (parties) responsible for contaminat-
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ing the sites. The idea is to get the sites cleaned quickly and
litigate over who is to blame later.
Various state agencies and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) identify the Superfund sites. The EPA
has the task of ranking these sites in priority order for
cleanup. Once the sites are catalogued, the EPA attempts
to identify the parties who were responsible for contami-
nating the sites. The statute establishes who will be liable
as responsible parties subject to limited defenses. The
parties theEPA initially identifies areknown as Potentially
Responsible Parties (PRPs). If the PRPs are willing, ca-
pable, and circumstances permit, the EPA may allow them
to clean up the site themselves. Even ifthey are not willing,
the EPA may select one or more of the PRPs and order
them to clean the site.
Who is Responsible
There are six different classes of parties who may be
responsible for the cleanup costs ofa contaminated Super-
fund site. These are: (1) current owners of the real estate,
(2) current operators of activities on the real estate, (3) past
owners, (4) past operators, (5) those who transported
hazardous substances to the site, and (6) thosewho gener-
ated the hazardous substances transported to the site.
These parties are "jointly and severally liable." The
parties are joined with respect to the total cost of cleanup
(that is, they cannot just clean their share). Moreover, any
one party may be severed from the rest and required to pay
the entire cleanup cost. Joint and several liability means
that one party who contributed minimally to contaminat-
ing a site, yet who has "deep pockets," may be required to
clean the site. Many people find the "deep pocket" theory
of liability manifestly unfair, especially when coupled with
true "strict liability."
The Elements of Liability
Strict liability, simply put, is liability without fault. Under
strict liability one need not show negligence on the part of
the defendant to recover from him. The classic tort liability
scheme consists offour elements. First, the defendant must
have some legally recognized duty. Second, he must breach
that duty. Third, his breach of the duty must cause the
injury. Fourth, the injury must result in damage to the
plaintiff.
For example, take the simplified case of an automobile
collision. Person^ runs a stop sign and collides with B. A's
duty is to obey the stop sign. By failing to heed the sign,,4
breached a legally recognized duty. IfB's car or person are
injured in the collision,B can recover damages. B's burden
of proof is not difficult. Assume, however, thatA has no
money, butA admits that he was distracted by Cwalking her
dog without a leash in an area where dogs must be on a
leash. C has also breached a duty, but that breach was
probably not a cause ofB's injury, at least not a foreseeable
or "proximate" cause. In a case to recover damages from C,
B's burden would be difficult to carry. Finally, assuming C
also has no money, what if the entire episode occurred in
D's parking lot? DoesD have a duty in this situation? In a
case against D, B would have trouble with all of the ele-
ments ofthe classic tort: duly, breach, causation, and damages.
CERCLA eases the burden on the plaintiff, usually the
EPA, for all ofthese elements in the case ofSuperfund sites.
The statute imposes a duty on any of the six classes of
parties any time they deal with hazardous substances. The
duty is simply to control the hazardous substances and keep
them from being released to the environment. A party
breaches that dutywhen a release or "threat of release" to
the environment occurs. The duty is "strict" because there
is no need for the plaintiff to prove negligence. The
plaintiffonly needs to show that the threat occurred. Why
it occurred is irrelevant in a strict liability scheme. In
comparison to the above auto collision example, ifA proved
that the stop sign had been knocked over or obscured by
trees, he might not be liable for negligence, but a strict
liability theory would hold him liable regardless. Fortu-
nately foryl, drivers are never held strictly liable.
The release ofa hazardous substance need not cause any
harm; in fact, release need not occur, only threat of release.
The threat, however, must cause EPA or some other party
(perhaps a state, city, or private individual) to react by
cleaning the site. The clean-up cost represents the damages
EPAmay recover. The following section will examine these
four elements more closely and discuss why CERCLA
liability is so easy to fall into and why it is so devastating.
Duty: Hazardous Substances
CERCLAimposes a duty on thosewho handle, orunwit-
tingly handled in the past, a category of chemicals now (or
sometime in the future) designated as hazardous substances.
At first blush, this sounds reasonable, butwhenone realizes
the relative harmlessness of some of the chemicals listed,
the range of CERCLA's effect can be quite startling.
Many hazardous substances are in routine household
use. While some hazardous substances will kill, or cause
mutations or serious injury, many are relatively innocuous.
And whether innocuous or not, the public's exposure to
some of these chemicals is extremely common. In fact it is
easy to imagine that everyone has handled and disposed of
some product containing a hazardous substance. For ex-
ample, acetone is a major ingredient in fingernail polish
remover; benzene is a major constituent of unleaded gaso-
lines; phosphoric acid is an ingredient in Coca-Cola. All of
these chemicals are hazardous substances.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that every business
in America uses hazardous substances. Because the list of
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hazardous substances encompasses so many commonly
used chemicals, almost all manufacturing industries are
major users.
Breach: Threat ofRelease
Another key to comprehending the range of CERCLA's
application is an understanding ofwhat constitutes a breach
of the hazardous substance duty. The breach occurs when
there is a threat of release to the environment of some
hazardous substance. The threat is merely of release, not
anything to do with danger or health effects. Danger is
presumed since we are dealing with hazardous substances.
A release is movement of a hazardous substance from
anything into the environment. The environment includes
air, water, soil, and ground water. If the substance spills
from a barrel to the ground, it is a release; if it seeps from
a landfill into the soil, it is a release; if it evaporates from an
open container, it is a release. Releases occur constantly,
and anyone who handles a hazardous substance will have
the impossible task of keeping track of it all.
Causation
Causation in the sense of physical danger or injury is not
required. What is more startling is that causation in the
sense of release is not required either. If the defendant
places a hazardous substance in a landfill, he may be held
liable even if the hazardous substance threatening release
is different. The defendant need not cause the release. He
must only be one of the six parties described earlier, for
example, the property owner.
Damages
Damages include the cost of response and remedial
action to clean the site. These costs can be quite substan-
tial since the sites must be cleaned to exceedingly low levels.
The average site cleanup cost in 1984 and 1985 exceeded
twelve million dollars.
Defenses
There are only five real defenses to CERCLA liability,
and none ofthem are very good. An act ofGod or an act of
war is the first defense. These are both closely circum-
scribed. It has been argued by theEPA that a fire started by
lightning striking a warehouse is not an act ofGod because
it is foreseeable and preventable by lightening rods.
The second defense is that the EPA granted a permit for
the release. The EPA is not likely to grant permits for the
release of hazardous substances without substantial assur-
ance of no possible harm. This defense is available to very
few property owners.
The third defense is that the release is not a release.
There are four categories of releases that are specifically
excluded. These are releases solely from the workplace
(regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration), releases from some engine exhausts, releases of
some nuclear materials (regulated by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission and Department of Energy), and the
normal application of fertilizer. This exception also ap-
plies to a very limited class of property owners.
A fourth defense is available if the hazardous substance
arrived on the property because of acts ofa third party with
whom the owner had no dealings. This is available only if
the owner took reasonable precautions to prevent such
occurrence. This defense is fairly good if the owner is the
victim of "midnight dumpers," but if the owner in any way
agreed to receive the material or knew that it was coming,
the defense is not good.
Finally, the fifth defense is that ofan innocent landowner
or innocent purchaser. If the owner came into possession
ofthe land without knowledge that it was contaminated and
made "all appropriate inquiry" without discovering its
contamination, then he may be deemed innocent and with-
out liability. All appropriate inquiry in the case ofcommer-
cial property requires an extensive environmental audit.
This audit must be performed by professional engineers
(evaluating facilities, chemicals and discharges), geologists
(evaluating soil and ground water conditions), and attor-
neys (performing title history searches, including leases).
Environmental audits are expensive and invariably un-
cover negative information.
Effect ofLiability
The effect of liability can be summarized very simplywith
actual case histories. A company purchased a tract of land
for $48,000 and the estimated cleanup bill was $2 million.
In another case, Maryland Bank & Trust Company fore-
closed on a piece of property and learned that they had not
only lost their security interest, but would also have to pay
for the site's cleanup as its owner. Finally, insurers are
being hit with coverage suits from their insureds. UTC, for
example, sued 240 insurers for pollution coverage regard-
ing its properties. In many cases the policies are standard
Comprehensive General Liability policies written before
CERCLA, which did not anticipate its absolute and retro-
active liability scheme.
Insurers
While insurance companies are not subject to CERCLA
liability, their reaction to it is important. If insurance
companies reason that potential liability is great, they will
charge high premiums. If, as many insurers contend, envi-
ronmental impairment is not a random insurable event and
instead a certain eventuality, they will refuse to insure en-
tirely.
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Insurance companies have incurred substantial, unantici-
pated losses for environmental damages. To reduce their
losses, insurance companies are generally refusing any envi-
ronmental impairment liability insurance and auditing poli-
cyholders to minimize risk. This has created a dire shortage
of needed insurance. Where there are companies granting
environmental policies, the policies are limited in scope,
usually covering only sudden occurrences.
Lenders
Lenders are often placed in a Catch-22 position. On the
one hand, they do not want to foreclose on potentially
contaminated property. On the other hand, they want to
protect their security interest. Ifbanks have already loaned
money, they might consider imposing restrictions on the
activities of their borrowers to reduce the likelihood of
CERCLA action. This activity, however, would be consid-
ered operation of the site and subject the lender to the same
liability that foreclosure brings. Generally, a bank's involve-
ment in the business affairs of a company handling hazard-
ous substances is suicidal. The best tack for money already
lent is to wait and see, and hope for the best.
With new loans, however, banks are in a better position to
protect their investments. All financial institutions are
expanding the methods they use to identify environmentally
high-risk borrowers. Pre-loan environmental audits are
common place. Soil tests are frequently required for existing
industrial facilities. Costs are borne by the potential bor-
rower, not the bank.
Many banks will require bor-
rowers to perform continuous
environmental audits during the
life of the loan to ensure envi-
ronmental compliance. This
treads close to meddling in the
affairs of the borrower, but most
banks only require an independ-
ent auditor to report the audit
results to the borrower's top man-
agement, forcing the borrower
to stay informed.
Finally, many lending institu-
tions will require the borrower
to secure environmental impair-
ment liability insurance. As noted
above, however, insurance is
scarce. And when it is available,
insurance companies put policy-
holders through another set of
hurdles. For many borrowers
the insurance requirement es-
sentially means that no loan will
be available.
State Government
Some stategovernments have stepped into theCERCLA
land transaction problem and added to the confusion. New
Jersey, for example, passed the landmark Environmental
Clean-up Responsibility Act (ECRA). The transfer of
industrial property will not be approved by the state envi-
ronmental agency until the site is cleaned of all contamina-
tion. Delays of several months in the transfer of property
are common. The whole thrust of the statute is to prevent
acquisition of liability by innocent purchasers.
Fortunately, states passing ECRA type legislation have
been restricted to the northeast and California. It seems
unlikely that either North or South Carolina will propose
such legislation given the New Jersey experience.
Purchasers
CERCLA liability substantially deters purchasers of existing
industrial property. The liability itself is frightening: the
average site cleanup costs over $12 million.
In addition, the acquisition of loans and insurance is
difficult and expensive, ifnot impossible. Finally, there are
often substantial delays in acquiring loan money to the
point where the transaction may no longer be worth its
original value.
The length of delays, the size of the additional transac-
tion costs, and the viability of the sale itself will all be a
function of the likelihood of finding contamination on the
The higherprobability that an existing industrialfacility contains hazardous substances leads to greater scrutiny
ofthe site by lenders, purchasers, and insurers, which increases the costs ofthe site.
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site. If the site is an existing industrial facility, it is more
likely to have hazardous substances than if it is virgin
property (although some property that appears clean is
not). The higher probability leads to greater scrutiny ofthe
site by the lender, purchaser, and insurer, which increases
the costs of the site regardless ofwhether the site is clean to
begin with.
Industrial site purchasers are increasingly subject to market
pressures that force their selection of unspoiled, virgin
property for commercial development. Virgin property
must be cleared, landscaped, and developed. Moreover,
such property is often far from desirable business districts.
Because of the threats of environmental liability, virgin
property will be selected over existing land with viable
structures and superior location. The consumption of this
virgin property is actually being propelled by the most
powerful of environmental statutes. The irony is striking.
What the Planner Can Do
Planners must be aware of the difficulty surrounding the
reuse of industrial and commercial property. Projected
development into outlying areas should exclude land that
has already had commercial uses. In addition, a higher
percentage of outlying land should be zoned for commer-
cial or industrial development; as businesses come and go,
they will not reuse existing locations nearly as often as the
planner might anticipate.
Another consideration is the acquisition of former in-
dustrial or commercial property by local governments for
infrastructure or other uses. City and county governments
are not excluded from liability (except through escheat
from tax delinquency). If local governments purchase
property outright or through eminent domain, they can be
held liable for cleanup costs. Therefore, planners should
not rely too heavily on projected reuse of commercial
properties by the local government. Such properties, once
audited, may turn out to be highly undesirable.
The ability of the planner to affect legislation may be
limited; however, the following suggestions may prove
valuable.
Local: Cover the Cost ofAudits
At the local level, the planner may be able to institute
regulations that will subsidize environmental auditing of
commercial property designated for continued business
use. This subsidy can be in the form of an actual payment
to potential purchaserswho commission the audit, or it can
be performed by the local health and environmental agency.
In either case, the local government should retain access to
the report and permit its use by subsequent potential
purchasers. In this way the local government will improve
its land planning strategy while gaining valuable environ-
mental information for the community.
State: Use Conversion Tax
At the state level, planners should make legislators aware
of the problems encountered by New Jersey under the
ECRA statute. Legislation to protect innocent purchasers
should be drafted to prevent the transactional barriers
created by ECRA
In addition, a one-time use conversion taxwould provide
an incentive to companies to reuse existing industrial prop-
erty. This type of tax would be imposed when non-indus-
trial property was converted to industrial use. Industrial
use would be defined as a particular level of hazardous
substance use.
The size of the tax could be geared to the type of effect
desired. If, on the one hand, the desired effect is simply to
encourage companies to consider existing locations, then
the tax should be equivalent to the additional transaction
costs associated with existing industrial property. This
would be approximated by the cost of an environmental
audit of a similarly sized tract. If, on the other hand, the
desired effect is to strongly encourage use of existing com-
mercial property over undeveloped land, then the tax should
reflect the relative risk between the two alternatives. The
size of this tax would be quite substantial and could drive
companies out of state.
Federal: CERCLA Amendments
Amendments to CERCLA will probably not occur for
several years. But when amendments are passed, planners
should be prepared to suggest taxes or other incentives to
offset the market incentives to consume undeveloped land.
This may prevent flight to neighboring states, but it might
not prevent flight to overseas locations, which has already
occurred.
Conclusion
CERCLA liability has propelled an undesirable environ-
mental and land use phenomena: the consumption of
undeveloped land for commercial and industrial uses. The
planner must understand the effects ofCERCLA liabilty in
order to pursue legislation at the state and local level to
alleviate the development pressures on virgin land and
permit cost effective reuse of commercial and industrial
property.
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